Environmental Law Reform: The Case for the ‘Reforming Centre’

This article was first published in Pandora’s Box, the annual academic journal of the University of Queensland's Justice and the Law Society.

I           Introduction

Democracy is an untidy business. Citizens cobble together political movements, feud over how to translate their shared values into policies, and then head out to convince others. Laws are debated, enacted, amended and repealed in an unceasing cycle of give and take. Society usually copes with this untidiness, but the natural world has no tolerance for human politics or the excuses we might make for inertia. And, in my experience, enduring change usually happens from what I call the ‘reforming centre,’ rather than the extremes.

This article makes the case for the ‘reforming centre’ by reflecting on four major environmental questions of my prime ministership: how to drive down greenhouse emissions; how to drive up investment in renewables; how to stop commercial whaling in the Antarctic; and how to advance climate action under international law.

There were, of course, other debates. We launched a 20-year biodiversity strategy designed to measure and protect the health of our precious ecosystems.[1] We achieved world heritage status for Ningaloo Reef – Western Australia’s largest and most accessible coral reef.[2] And we ploughed through a backlog of contentious environmental applications described by one minister as ‘an in-tray stuffed with explosive devices and hospital passes.’[3] I won’t elaborate on these, or the many more besides, but each had similar dynamics.

II         Defining the ‘Reforming Centre’

In my experience, enduring reforms often have three features: progressiveness; effectiveness; and legitimacy.

By ‘progressive,’ I do not necessarily mean ‘left.’ In fact, among the most useful progressive reforms in our history – the expansion of Australia’s universities – was led by Liberal Party founder Robert Menzies. In this essay, a ‘progressive’ outlook is characterised by optimism and ambition to craft our national future, rather than kneejerk fear or yearning for a glorified, often mythical, past.

Nor does ‘effective’ mean ‘ideal.’ There are no silver-bullet policies that solve every problem and foresee every challenge. But we should strive to ‘effect’ the best available outcome and, importantly, entrench it as a platform for future progress. This can involve bittersweet compromise, but practically every great reform was built on a less-than-perfect foundation. If a reform is never implemented in the first place, its ineffectiveness is practically guaranteed.

‘Legitimacy’ – meaning sufficient support across the political centre-ground – serves two important purposes: first, governments must win elections to enact reforms and; second, reforms must outlast the governments that introduce them. For instance, Gough Whitlam won office by animating the progressive instinct of middle Australia, rewriting some 80% of Labor’s platform in the process, and negotiating his most enduring reforms through a hostile senate.[4] Bob Hawke and Paul Keating were lashed as not ‘real Labor’ for harnessing the dynamism of economic markets as an engine of social progress, but they entrenched these gains by winning five consecutive election victories from the centre.[5] Even John Howard, hardly a progressive icon, worked across the centre to implement enduring gun control over howls from his traditional allies.[6]

While there are always exceptions to the rule, reforms with these three elements are more likely to withstand the test of time. And in environmental reform, where the stakes can be existential, it is essential that reforms endure.

III        Historical Context

This article is not intended to be partisan. Nor does it in any way reflect the views of the current Australian government. Its analysis may, however, be helpful to environmental reformers of any political stripe. As these are personal reflections on a certain time and place, it is necessary to sketch out the four major political groupings relevant to these debates between 2007 and 2013:

-          The social-democratic centre-left – led by my new Labor government which, after 11 years in the wilderness, was elected to advance major environmental reform;

-          The regressive right – half the opposition Liberal Party led by Tony Abbott, a consummate tactician, but whose mistrust of environmental science caused him to approach reform with suspicion;

-          The liberal centre-right – the other half, led by Malcolm Turnbull, whose pursuit of reform was tempered by the risk of inflaming his regressive partners; and

-          The contrarian left – led by Bob Brown, a veteran protestor who elevated the Green party’s profile by attacking all others’ reforms for not being radical enough.

IV        The Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)

At the 2007 election, Australia’s mechanism for reducing greenhouse emissions appeared settled. We had pledged to ratify the Kyoto Protocol[7] (the first legally binding climate treaty) and begin decarbonising the economy through an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The ETS would set an annual limit for greenhouse pollution, then let businesses decide how to make it happen. If a company found cutting emissions too costly, they could buy excess permits produced by businesses that exceeded their responsibilities – thus setting a market ‘price’ on carbon. As our national targets were updated, the annual emissions cap would progressively tighten and the carbon price would respond to supply and demand. This would steadily decarbonise the economy at the lowest possible cost while creating incentives to invest in cleaner practices.

I ratified the Kyoto Protocol as my first prime ministerial act. Many expected the ETS to come easily too, given every parliamentary party had campaigned for it. Even the regressive right accepted that, whatever the election outcome, carbon pricing was ‘inevitable.’[8] We followed a traditional policy process involving a green paper, white paper, draft legislation, a parliamentary inquiry, and high-level negotiations with all parties. In December 2009, when the final Bills were voted on, the CPRS was supported by two-thirds of voters (including 57% of opposition supporters),[9] corporate leaders at the Australian Industry Group and Business Council,[10] and environmentalists at the World Wildlife Fund, Climate Institute and Conservation Council.[11] Yet the fringes united against the centre to sabotage climate action. Why?

We agreed a list of amendments with Turnbull, then the opposition leader, who believed he could hold his party together. But Abbott, despite arguing to pass the CPRS only months earlier,[12] challenged for the party’s leadership and won by a single vote (in a cruel twist, a close ally of Turnbull was at home sick). Nonetheless, a group of centre-right MPs, led by Turnbull, were willing to cross the floor. These conscientious objectors were crucial because, with their backing, the legislation could still pass.

However, the Green party lacked effectiveness. Instead of entrenching the pricing mechanism as a starting point, they claimed its initial emissions reduction target (5-25% by 2020) was a ‘complete fraud’[13] and publicly savaged scientists who argued otherwise.[14] These tactics paid off politically – Brown’s party achieved a record 12% of the vote in 2010 – but backfired for the environment. Without the CPRS, Australia emitted over 200 million extra tonnes of carbon dioxide over a decade.[15] And, instead of discussing what our targets should be, the next decade was wasted debating the virtues of different mechanisms – or worse still, whether the climate was changing at all. Brown expected his actions would spur demands for more radical action; instead, the public’s enthusiasm waned and progress became more distant.

Amid the Senate impasse, serious questions emerged. Could we re-prosecute the legislation with an election due? Would it be ready for the new Kyoto commitment period after 2012? How should the imminent budget reflect this uncertainty? In a four-member cabinet subcommittee, the Deputy Prime Minister opposed rolling the dice on a snap election and, with the Treasurer, argued to ditch the CPRS. The Finance Minister supported the CPRS but wanted to protect the budget’s fiscal integrity. So we collectively proposed to realign the legislative schedule to the next Kyoto period – a delay of two years. This would prove a serious political miscalculation on my part. Before the full cabinet could meet to decide the way forward, one of my subcommittee colleagues leaked the government’s ‘decision’ to the press. This two-year delay was widely – but falsely – framed as abandoning emissions trading. The change in Labor leadership followed, and Prime Minister Julia Gillard dumped the CPRS.[16]

At the 2010 election, the enlarged Green faction peeled enough votes from the government to convince Gillard to share power. Astonishingly, having condemned the CPRS’s initial target for failing ‘the bare minimum required by the science,’[17] they signed up to new legislation with the very same target.[18]  I was proud to support this legislation. But this ‘carbon tax’ lacked legitimacy. It bypassed the Liberal centre-right, was opposed by 63% of Australians,[19] and it violated an election promise not to introduce such a tax[20] – so it did not survive the Abbott government. Although worthy elements of that legislation remain – notably the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, which leverages private-sector investment – effective carbon pricing was dead. So began Australia’s lost decade for climate action.

V         The Renewable Energy Target (RET)

Another plank of our election platform was the five-fold expansion of renewable energy, to provide at least 20% of electricity generation by 2020 by requiring the biggest purchasers of electricity to buy a certain amount from renewable sources each year. Despite repeated assaults from hardliners, this policy became an enduring success.

The RET’s latter-day critics often forget that this was not a leftist revolutionary idea; it built on a scheme introduced in 2000[21] by centre-right Environment Minister Robert Hill, who convinced his regressive colleagues to permit a modest 2% target. While initially doing little, Hill hoped to build a ‘strong base’ for the industry to build on.[22] The contrarian left condemned the legislation as an ‘environmental monstrosity’[23] and insisted on higher targets that would have splintered Hill’s delicate coalition.[24]  But, working across the centre, it passed.

After 2007, this history provided a permission structure for both wings of the opposition to support our 20% target. As one regressive senator told parliament: ‘The amendment Bill we are discussing today is in fact building on that legacy of the Howard government – a legacy, I might say, which was very good and very strong in the environmental area.’[25] However modest, Hill’s legislation laid the groundwork to kickstart the renewables transformation.

The scheme’s legitimacy also helped defend the RET from attack. In 2014, Abbott broke an election promise[26] by hiring a self-described ‘sceptic’[27] of climate science to conduct a snap review that sent a chill through investor circles and froze $10 billion in investments.[28] His government demanded the centre-left agree to slash the RET’s headline target by 40% – or else they would petrify investors further by inviting various crossbench senators to propose their own amendments.[29] Despite initially claiming he wanted ‘certainty’[30] for the sector, Abbott later admitted he wanted to ‘reduce the growth rate of this particular sector as much as possible.’[31] The contrarian left’s refusal to entertain any compromise looked tough, but it aligned them with the fringe right (who themselves wanted the investment strike to continue indefinitely).

In May 2015, after months of hard-fought negotiation between people of goodwill, an agreement was struck. The gigawatt hour target enumerated in legislation would be reduced, but the percentage target remained on track for 20-25% due to gains in energy efficiency.[32] This bipartisan signal unclogged the flow of capital and stability, restored by repealing periodic reviews of the legislation. I am grateful for the reforming centre’s defence of my government’s 20% RET which, by building on Hill’s legislation, built up a sector that now supplies about 40% of Australia’s electricity.[33]

VI        The Whaling Case

Our new government also promised to take legal action, if necessary, to halt Japan’s annual commercial whale hunt in the Southern Ocean, which was killing almost 1000 whales each summer.

Australian law was not especially helpful. Commercial whaling was already prohibited in the economic waters of Australia’s Antarctic waters.[34] But when a wildlife charity asked the Federal Court to enforce the sanctuary in 2004, the Howard government intervened against it, fearing diplomatic fallout from Japan – then our largest trading partner. Our government withdrew this objection in 2008, after which the court ruled against the whalers.[35] Even so, Japan rejected our territorial claim, along with the court’s jurisdiction, and the whaling company had no onshore assets to restrain.

We therefore relied on Japan’s obligations to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) established under the Whaling Convention.[36] The IWC had declared a Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary in 1994, but Japan lodged an objection and was not bound by it. However, Tokyo had agreed to an older global moratorium on commercial whaling, which it was evading by insisting its hunters were undertaking genuine ‘scientific’ research. Australians’ dwindling tolerance for this gruesome ‘science’ evaporated in 2005 when Japan doubled its whaling quota and broadened it to include threatened humpback and fin whales.

The Japanese tactics exposed fault lines in Canberra, which had been united against whaling for decades. The Howard government insisted there was ‘no legal theory available’[37] to challenge the hunt and, despite being ‘very unhappy’ with the whalers, ‘short of going to war with them, it’s hard to see how you can actually stop it.’[38] The contrarian left, on the other hand, wanted to detonate a diplomatic bomb by militarising the whale sanctuary,[39] seizing Japanese ships,[40] cancelling trade talks, blocking cultural exchanges and even recalling Australian troops protecting Japanese humanitarian efforts in the Middle East.[41] Australians further polarised over the tactics of Sea Shepherd – a group that splintered from Greenpeace over the use of violence – whose altercations with the hunters were leading to dangerous collisions, exchanges with water-cannons, sprays of nauseating rotten food, boarding parties, arrests, and prosecutions. Some on the right joined Japan in branding them ‘pirates,’ while the contrarian left wanted to provide them with intelligence on Japanese ship locations.

Our new government hoped the shadow of legal action, paired with tougher diplomatic pressure, could persuade Japan to phase-out commercial whaling over a few years. If not, we would head to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). We immediately sent a customs ship to gather evidence on the whalers’ activities, and appointed a special diplomatic envoy to prosecute the diplomacy. This included direct lobbying, instigating a joint demarche of sympathetic diplomats in Tokyo, releasing images of whale killings to the public, and pushing the IWC to properly define ‘scientific purposes.’ In May 2010, we filed our case.

While our lawyers prepared their briefs, our responsibility was to shore up legitimacy at home. International lawsuits often take years, and it was vital that the reforming centre be prepared to defend it. The initial signs were good: the contrarian left supported it – despite demanding criminal charges against individual Japanese sailors as well[42] – while the centre-right shadow minister had long been taunting us to ‘stand up for Australian interests’ and file the lawsuit.[43]

But the opposition was split. Abbott, who had opposed legal action as ‘needlessly antagonis[ing] our most important trading partner,’[44] was noncommittal.[45] Some of his allies condemned the lawsuit as premature, suggesting we consider Japan’s proposed ‘solution’ of lifting the moratorium.[46] Meanwhile the shadow minister, who had previously backed legal action as a negotiating tactic,[47] suddenly insisted we rule out any out-of-court agreement.[48] Amid this confusion, our government shone a spotlight on the centre-right’s record of supporting legal action, limiting Abbott’s room to manoeuvre.[49] On the eve of the 2010 election, buried deep within a coalition policy statement, they announced support for the case.[50]

Four years later, on 31 March 2014, the ICJ handed down its ruling. In a 12-4 decision, the judges found ‘the evidence does not establish that the programme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives’ of scientific research.[51] Japan accepted the judgment and, after flirting with a pared-back ‘scientific’ hunt, admitted its interest was indeed commercial and declared the Antarctic off-limits.[52]

I cannot say what finally motivated the Australian opposition to fall into line. A decisive factor may have been the response of Japan which, despite all the predictions of diplomatic mayhem, wisely downplayed the matter. Both governments left the whaling dispute to the lawyers,[53] and focused on areas of cooperation, such as trade negotiations and international arms control.[54] Nor can I say whether a 2010 Abbott government would have held firm. But, by the time he won office in 2013, it had been his position at consecutive elections.[55]

The result is that Antarctic minke whale populations, after collapsing by 30% over a decade, are on the rise.[56] Fin whales – previously hunted to 2% of their original numbers – are returning in large numbers to their ancestral feeding grounds.[57] And humpbacks[58] are no longer a threatened species, doubling in population over a decade, and expected to fully recover by 2050.[59]

VII      The Copenhagen Accord

By 2007, Canberra’s global reputation on climate action was battered. As the highest per-capita emitter, Australia won huge concessions at Kyoto in 1997. But Howard, despite governing the driest inhabited continent and 80% of Australians supporting the treaty, refused to ratify it.[60] The election of our climate-progressive government re-legitimised Australia’s voice in the international community (where action was critical to achieve real outcomes for our climate-challenged land) and, furthermore, Australia secured a seat at the 25-member negotiating table as a ‘friend of the chair’ at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15).

The major questions before the COP15 conference were: first, the maximum average global temperature the world was prepared to accept; second, whether only developed economies needed to decarbonise (or, as the science required, rapidly developing countries needed to act as well); third, whether there would be international measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of each national effort; fourth, the creation of a global ‘green climate fund’ to support poor countries’ adaptation and mitigation and; finally, but not least, how national undertakings would be registered and honoured under international law.

The alliance for progress on these questions was impressive. It comprised the developing countries most susceptible to climate change[61] and the developed countries, who would pledge massive cuts under a global deal.[62] But the coalition of obstruction was also fierce, led by India and China, who rejected low-lying countries’ calls to keep average temperature rises below 1.5°C of pre-industrial levels – beyond which some polar ice sheets reach their ‘tipping points’[63] – and argued that even 2°C was too restrictive. They also wanted free rein to pollute, branding me an ‘ayatollah’ on climate action for highlighting the obvious flaw in this approach.[64] They rebuked ‘intrusive’ MRV and opposed linking such accountability to any ‘green fund.’ And they opposed a mid-century global emissions target of 50% below 1990 levels (which, we were advised, would keep warming below 2°C) – even when developed countries were willing to carry the load of an 80% cut.[65]

The Copenhagen negotiations themselves were gruelling.[66] As the obstructions became clear, so too did our mission: we could not walk away in abject defeat. Instead, we would grasp opportunities for progress wherever we could, and erect a platform for the next round of negotiations.

From these efforts, the Copenhagen Accord[67] extracted major policy concessions. First, we agreed a maximum ceiling of keeping global warming ‘below 2°C’ – Australian language designed to break the impasse while keeping 1.5°C in scope. Second, emissions needed to ‘peak’ in every country as soon as possible, not just in the most developed ones – no longer would China and India wriggle off the hook. Third, developed countries would mobilise USD100 billion annually to assist developing countries – significantly through a ‘Green Climate Fund’ – with all assisted projects subject to MRV. And finally, having realised the difficulty of striking a ‘top down’ treaty for the entire world, the Copenhagen Accord invited countries to nominate their own targets – also an Australian response to Chinese and American reluctance toward binding, mandatory and enforceable targets.

But, despite real progress, the COP15 conference entered the public consciousness as an unmitigated catastrophe that sapped enthusiasm around the world. In Australia, between 2007 and 2012, public support for urgent climate action collapsed from 68% to 36%,[68] while climate scepticism rose from 7% to 18%.[69] What drove this?

First, the Copenhagen Accord was not formally adopted as international law. Although China and India signed up in the negotiating room, they joined Brazil and South Africa to prevent the Accord being gavelled into law. But this was a temporary setback – the provisions were enacted at COP16 the next year, after China and India recognised that momentum across the global south was turning against them.

Second, the obstructionists – led by the biggest economies of the global south – successfully presented themselves as speaking for the developing world, despite actually resisting the demands of the most vulnerable poorer countries. This framed the dispute as being between rich countries, who emitted the most carbon historically, and poor ones, who deserved the same privilege. As Mark Lynas, an environmental activist attached to the Maldives delegation, recounted:

China’s strategy was simple: block the open negotiations for two weeks, and then ensure that the closed-door deal made it look as if the west had failed the world’s poor once again. And sure enough, the aid agencies, civil society movements and environmental groups all took the bait.[70]

Back in Australia, both ends of the political spectrum leapt to this same conclusion. The contrarian left, who predicted Copenhagen talks would shame Australia’s lack of ambition, blamed ‘the complete failure of developed world leaders’ who supposedly ‘demanded compromises from the developing world but offered none itself.’[71] Meanwhile, the regressive right endorsed the obstructionists’ refusal to ‘compromise their economic progress,’[72] arguing that climate action was an ‘economic and environmental own goal,’[73] and stoked the fires of scepticism by insisting ‘the so-called “settled science” of climate change is not so settled as the climate catastrophists would have us believe.’[74]

The Copenhagen Accord might not have met the high expectations that were set for it, but it was a solid 7-out-of-10 outcome against the core policy objectives of the moment. Against all the political, media and NGO background noise, who could blame the public for being disappointed that there was no Hollywood-style grand finale? But a closer look at the history shows the breakthroughs of the Copenhagen Accord laid the foundations upon which the Paris Agreement[75] was struck in 2015 – notably the ‘well below 2°C’ ceiling, developed and developing country responsibility, ‘nationally determined contributions’ and MRV. Absent Copenhagen, there could have been no Paris, with most of the core policy thresholds crafted and crossed back in 2009.

VIII     Conclusion

Reforming from the centre can be difficult. It requires the willingness to grapple with challenges in all their policy and political complexity – not just offering simplistic solutions. It takes creativity to imagine how we might convince others, and humility to open our own minds to their viewpoints. Rarely can we celebrate ‘absolute victory,’ since there is always more to do. Meanwhile, critics with their own motives revel in exaggerating or minimising those achievements – often aided and abetted by an analytically thin commentariat that depends on the simple binary narrative of  ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ No wonder that some find the clarity of uncompromising activism so appealing.

I urge readers to take a wider and deeper view. While many great reforms are prematurely snuffed out by shortsightedness or extinguished by the winds of political misfortune, lasting reform is still possible. We can draw on our society’s strong foundations, such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, the professional public service, parliamentary democracy, and freedom of the press.

We also have a body of national experience from which to draw. Without commenting on the merits of particular reforms, I am pleased when others try to build on our legacy in government: that the Climate Change Act[76] reflects Australia’s nationally determined contribution as envisioned by the Copenhagen Accord; that the RET has put Australia within reach of 82% renewable energy by 2030; that when political elders urge more obstruction, their successors will more often pause to consider the long-term consequences; and that, when Australians stand up for threatened species, the world knows we won’t easily back down. And agencies like the Clean Energy Finance Corporation — which has unlocked $70 billion of investments, mobilising 5 dollars of private capital for every public dollar it invests, while turning a profit for taxpayers — can be defended and improved.

Our government, for all our efforts, and all our shortcomings, was simply one link in the chain of environmental and climate policy reform to support our planet and all its environmental peoples. And real and enduring change, after all, is what it is all about.

Kevin Rudd writes in his capacity as the 26th Prime Minister of Australia.

* Kevin Rudd AC is the Australian Ambassador to the United States. From 2007 to 2010 and June to September 2013, he served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister.

[1] See Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010 – 2030 (Report, 2010).

[2] See ‘Ningaloo Coast’, UNESCO World Heritage Convention (Web Page) <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1369/>.

[3] Peter Garrett, Big Blue Sky (Allen & Unwin, 2017) 241.

[4] Peter Kennedy, ‘A view of Labor’, The West Australian (Perth, 9 November 1974).

[5] Bob Hawke, ‘Our Fourth Anniversary’ (Speech, Bathurst, 8 March 1987).

[6] See Australasian Police Ministers’ Council, Special Firearms Meeting – Resolutions (10 May 1996).

[7] Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 162 (entered into force 16 February 2005).

[8] Eric Abetz, ‘The Future of Forestry’ (Speech, Brisbane, 28 June 2007).

[9] Parliament of Australia, Journals of the Senate (2 December 2009) 3048; ‘Newspoll’, The Australian (Sydney, 22 September 2009).

[10] Nicola Berkovic, ‘Business begs Abbot to rethink opposition to market-based emissions trading scheme’, The Australian (Sydney, 3 December 2009).

[11] ‘Restyled emissions scheme wins broad support’, ABC PM (Emma Griffiths, 4 May 2009) <https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/pm/restyled-emissions-scheme-wins-broad-support/1672686>.

[12] Tony Abbott, ‘Turnbull is right, the Coalition can’t win this fight’, The Australian (Sydney, 24 July 2009); Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Abbott’s climate change policy is bullshit’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online, 7 December 2009) <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/abbotts-climate-change-policy-is-bullshit-20091207-kdmb.html>.

[13] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 24 November 2009, 8736 (Christine Milne).

[14] Ross Peake, ‘Greens scold Flanner over emissions remark’, The Canberra Times (Canberra, 1 July 2009).

[15] Pat Conroy, ‘Climate Policy Impasse Has Cost Us Dearly’, Newcastle Herald (Newcastle, 3 December 2019).

[16] See Kevin Rudd, The PM Years (Pan Macmillan, 2018).

[17] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 24 November 2009, 8669 (Sarah Hanson-Young).

[18] See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) as repealed by Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2013 (Cth).

[19] Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll 2012: Public opinion and foreign policy (Lowy Institute for International Policy Report, 2012) 5.

[20] Interview with Julia Gillard (2SM, 28 February 2011).

[21] Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth).

[22] Robert Hill, ‘Renewable Energy Targets a Step Closer’ (Statement, 9 May 2000); See also Robert Hill, ‘Investing in Our Natural and Cultural Heritage: The Commonwealth’s Environmental Expenditure 2000-01’ (Statement, 9 May 2000) 12.

[23] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 December 2000, 21198 (Bob Brown).

[24] Bob Brown, ‘Greens challenge Democrats on the environment’ (Statement, 28 October 2000).

[25] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 August 2009, 5351 (Eric Abetz).

[26] See Liberal-National Coalition, The Coalition’s Policy to Boost the Competitiveness of Australian Manufacturing (August 2013) 11.

[27] J Heath, ‘Sceptic Warburton to lead energy review’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 18 February 2014).

[28] Phil Coorey, ‘Industry proffers RET compromise’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 26 March 2015).

[29] See L Cox, ‘Renewable energy deal possible’, The Age (Melbourne, 28 March 2015). See also Interview with Mark Butler (ABC News 24, 19 March 2015).

[30] Joint Doorstop Interview with Tony Abbott, Eric Hutchinson and Will Hodgman (Launceston, Tasmania, 19 February 2015).

[31] Phil Coorey and Angela Macdonald-Smith, ‘PM admits plan to sink RET’, Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 12 June 2015).

[32] See Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth).

[33] Clean Energy Council, Clean Energy Australia 2024 (Report, 2024) 11.

[34] Whale Protection Act 1980 (Cth); Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) s 225.

[35] Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2008] FCA 36.

[36] International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for signature 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72 (entered into force 10 November 1948).

[37] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 9 February 2006, 88 (Ian Campbell).

[38] Doorstop Interview with Alexander Downer (Adelaide, South Australia, 19 November 2007).

[39] See C Johnson, ‘Japan asks navy to protect whalers’, The West Australian (Perth, 13 November 2007).

[40] Bob Brown, ‘Campbell should put whale killers out of action’ (Statement, 22 December 2005).

[41] Bob Brown, ‘Howard should tell whaler Koizumi “the Iraq deal is off”’ (Statement, 16 May 2005).

[42] Bob Brown, ‘Whaling court case won’t stop harpoons’ (Statement, 28 May 2010).

[43] See Penny Wong, ‘No international legal action on whaling: Abbott’ (Statement, 11 January 2009).

[44] See Michelle Grattan and Andrew Darby, ‘Abbott rejects whaling legal bid’, The Age (Melbourne, 12 January 2010).

[45] Doorstop Interview with Tony Abbott (Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, 26 May 2010).

[46] Russell Trood, ‘Rudd all at sea on whaling’ (Statement, 3 June 2010).

[47] Greg Hunt, ‘The time has come on whaling action’ (Statement, 4 January 2010).

[48] Greg Hunt, ‘Peter, just say “no” to commercial whaling’ (Statement, 22 June 2010).

[49] Peter Garrett, ‘Phoney Tony’s whaling flip flops continue’ (Statement, 28 May 2010).

[50] Greg Hunt, ‘Coalition’s whale and dolphin protection plan’ (Statement, 11 August 2010).

[51] Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep 226, 293 [227].

[52] Yoshihide Suga, ‘Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Government of Japan, on International Court of Justice “Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening)”’ (Press Release, 31 March 2014).

[53] See Rosslyn Beeby, ‘Whaling case just politics: Japan’, The Canberra Times (Canberra, 29 May 2010).

[54] See Hidenobu Sobashima, ‘Press Conference by the Deputy Press Secretary’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Web Page, 25 November 2010) [2. Visit to Australia by Foreign Minister Maehara] <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2010/11/1125_01.html>.

[55] Greg Hunt, ‘Coalition announces whale & dolphin protection plan’ (Statement, 23 August 2013).

[56] Helena Herr et al, ‘Aerial surveys for Antarctic minke whales (Balaenoptera bonaerensis) reveal sea ice dependent distribution patterns’ (2019) 9(1) Ecology and Evolution 5664.

[57] Helena Herr et al, ‘Return of large fin whale feeding aggregations to historical whaling grounds in the Southern Ocean’ (2022) 12(1) Scientific Reports 9458:1-15.

[58] Australian Government, ‘Humpback whale’, Australian Antarctic Program (Web Page, 22 August 2022) <https://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/animals/whales/humpback-whale/>.

[59] Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, ‘Post-whaling recovery of southern hemisphere’ (News Release, 22 August 2017).

[60] C Miller et al, ‘Climate deal offers windfall for Australia’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 25 June 2001); C Martin, ‘Polls shows 80pc back Kyoto deal’, Australian Financial Review (20 April 2001).

[61] See ‘Tactical manoeuvring on climate change must end, South Pacific leaders tell UN debate’, United Nations News (online, 26 September 2009) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2009/09/314772>.

[62] See David Adam, ‘G8 Action without China and India would be pointless’, The Guardian (online, 10 July 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/cif-green/2009/jul/09/copenhagen-g8>.

[63] Timothy M Lenton et al, ‘Climate tipping points – too risky to bet against’ (2019) 575(1) Nature 592.

[64] ‘India says Aus acting as “ayatollah” in climate talks’, The Indian Express (Mumbai, 16 December 2009).

[65] United Kingdom Department of Energy and Climate Change, The Road to Copenhagen: The UK Government’s case for an ambitious international agreement on climate change (Policy Paper, 26 June 2009) 5. See also ‘China stands as constructive player in Copenhagen’, Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, 26 December 2009); E Reguly and S McCarthy, ‘US makes last-minute push’, The Globe and Mail (Toronto, 17 December 2009); Björn Conrad, ‘China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the “Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy”’ (2012) 210(1) The China Quarterly 435.

[66] Masochistic readers can find my first-hand account in The PM Years (n 16) 203-229.

[67] See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (18 December 2009).

[68] Allan Gyngell, The Lowy Institute Poll 2007: Australia and the World – Public opinion and foreign policy (Lowy Institute for International Policy Report, 30 August 2007) 9.

[69] ‘Newspoll’, The Australian (Sydney, 16 February 2010).

[70] Mark Lynas, ‘How China gutted Copenhagen and avoided the blame’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 26 December 2009).

[71] Christine Milne, ‘Meaningless Copenhagen declaration highlights global inaction’ (Statement, 19 December 2009).

[72] Interview with Tony Abbott (2GB, 11 January 2010).

[73] Tony Abbott, ‘Address to the Young Liberal Convention, Adelaide’ (Speech, 30 January 2010).

[74] Interview with Tony Abbott (2GB 27 January 2010).

[75] Paris Agreement, opened for signature 22 April 2016, 3156 UNTS 79 (entered into force 4 November 2016).

[76] 2022 (Cth).