Kevin Rudd discusses China under Xi Jinping on ABC 7.30
E&OE TRANSCRIPT
TELEVISION INTERVIEW
ABC TV, 7.30 - 4 August 2026
Sarah Ferguson
Kevin Rudd, welcome to 7:30.
Kevin Rudd
Good to be back.
Sarah Ferguson
You are surely the only Western leader to have spoken with Xi Jinping in Mandarin at length. Since then, you have studied him in great detail. You say about Xi that he means what he says. Now, he says he wants China and Taiwan reunified. You see a potential danger over Taiwan as soon as 2028. Why is that?
Kevin Rudd
Well, what I've said a number of times, Sarah, is that I see this as a one-in-three risk. The reason I say that, it brings together a whole bunch of factors. The first thing is that Xi Jinping will get his reappointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party in October of 2027. That'll be for a record fourth term. Secondly, you have the Taiwanese presidential elections occurring in January of 2028, and if the ruling Democratic Progress Party, the DPP, is reappointed, it is conceivable, given its historical pro-independence stance, that Xi Jinping would regard this as a trigger in terms of China's long-established anti-secession law. And the third factor is Xi Jinping's calculus of the robustness of President Trump's posture on deterrence by the United States against China over Taiwan. If you put those three factors together, it elevates the risk, which is why we need to be super mindful about the deterrence equation leading into 2028.
Sarah Ferguson
Xi said to Donald Trump that this is a very dangerous issue, which could result in collision and conflict. Is his choice of words there significant?
Kevin Rudd
It is because that's the first time I've heard Xi Jinping use that sort of absolutely direct language with a U.S. president, in the context of a formal bilateral summit, and so Xi Jinping is laying down his own markers. Of course, President Trump's language in response to that has been criticized in the United States for being less than robust, pointing out that Taiwan was a long way away from the United States, that the United States military would be far-stretched in terms of its ability to defend Taiwan, being some 9,000 miles away and only 100 miles off the Chinese coast, and so therefore it's both Xi Jinping's statement and Donald Trump's response, which has given rise to, as I said, further concerns about the maintenance of peace and stability through to the end of 2028.
Sarah Ferguson
Does anyone actually know how Donald Trump would respond? How often does he mean what he says?
Kevin Rudd
That is an excellent question on the issue of deterrence as it relates to China over Taiwan. What we can observe, however, is the continuing posture of the United States Pacific Command, led by Admiral Paparo, these are the folks who are in the front line, and they, under Admiral Paparo, every day of the week, every week of the year, are sustaining the posture of U.S. deterrence over Taiwan actually in the theater. The political language will therefore come and go and, to be fair to President Trump, it has come and gone a lot over the years with previous U.S. presidents as well. But where the actual substance of U.S. deterrence posture lies is in the capabilities set represented by U.S. Pacific Command, and as I said, that set of postures has not changed. But deterrence at the end of the day is a combination of two things: capabilities, reflected by the U.S. Navy in particular and its capabilities in the region; plus the Chinese calculus of U.S. political will, which is where President Trump's language does enter into the equation.
Sarah Ferguson
As ambassador, that post that you've just left, did you understand Xi Jinping better than you understood Donald Trump?
Kevin Rudd
That's a very unusual question. Well, I've made a professional academic study of Xi Jinping over quite a number of years. I chose to -- one of the craziest things I've done in life, I suppose -- to enroll in an Oxford PhD on Xi Jinping's ideology, and therefore forced myself to read everything he has said and written on the question of his future vision for China. So I've made a professional study of Xi Jinping. In terms of President Trump, obviously I've worked with the administration closely for a year and a half. I think, in terms of navigating Australia's interests with the United States, that the embassy and the government did well in terms of our AUKUS negotiations, our critical minerals negotiations, our critical technology negotiations and, in the mainstream, our trade negotiations as well, although there are still frictions around the edges of that. But there we've been dealing with, frankly, all the other elements of the Trump administration: Secretary Bessent of the Treasury, Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, and only occasionally with the President himself.
Sarah Ferguson
Have you spoken to Anthony Albanese or Penny Wong about this view that you have about the potential danger in 2028, and if so, what did they say?
Kevin Rudd
Well, the great thing about being an ambassador for your country is that your own discussions with your political leaders, the foreign minister Penny Wong, and with the prime minister Anthony Albanese, remain confidential. So I don't want to go to the substance of those discussions with them; that would be unprofessional. But the views that I have personally reflected in the public domain about the relative risk that we face in 2028, I've been pretty consistent on for a number of years as we begin to put the evidence together. And so I think I've got a responsibility, as I now head a U.S.-based think tank, the Asia Society, to be very clear in the public debate about the elevated risks that we face, but, most importantly, the importance of deterrence in ensuring that those risks are managed and dealt with in the two-to-three years which lie ahead, so that we can in fact preserve stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region, because that's of fundamental interest to Australia.
Sarah Ferguson
Well, with the delivery of the first nuclear-powered submarine under the AUKUS deal not due until 2032, Australia could only be peripheral at most to such a conflict. Is that right?
Kevin Rudd
Well, the posture of successive Australian governments over the years, including myself as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, is that we never publicly speculate on what Australia might or might not do in the eventuality of a Taiwan Straits crisis. That doesn't actually help in the material world, and I don't intend to change that posture now. In terms of the arrival of Australian submarines, frankly, that five-year period will fast come by, and this will be a great addition to the Royal Australian Navy's capability set in terms of our ability to maintain Australia's own sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific as well. When we look, for example, at the expansion of China's own submarine fleet -- look, for example, at the fact that China now has some 60 to 75 submarines of which 15 to 20 are nuclear powered, and a number in addition to that are ballistic missile submarines, that is nuclear armed -- the fact that we, from time to time, receive inbound commentary from various Chinese commentators, such as Victor Gao, about it being inappropriate for Australia to acquire these capabilities, frankly, we need to put it into a context, which is China has a massive submarine fleet and it's growing. They are currently at size, when compared boat-for-boat, against the size of the U.S. Pacific submarine fleet, and the Chinese surface fleet is already some 370 boats larger than the U.S. surface fleet of some 290 operational ships as we stand. So it's important that Australia has its own naval capabilities, given in fact the changes to the strategic and military balance which are occurring within our wider region. Our job is to look after Australia and, of course, our wider allied interests.
Sarah Ferguson
You just mentioned Victor Gao. He said on this program recently just that, that Australia is a legitimate target because of its involvement in AUKUS. Is that view expressed by him or others in academia in China, is it bluster, or does it represent the view more accurately of the Chinese government and military?
Kevin Rudd
Well, Mr. Gao is a professional provocateur on the part of the Chinese -- let's call it -- political establishment. If you look at his commentary around the world, he majors in provocative statements. And in doing so, he should be very mindful, by the way, of China's sovereign obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and ensuring that no threats are made against states within the zone area, given that that treaty has been in existence since about 1985-1986. In terms of the broader position of the Chinese government, if you look at official statements through the Chinese media since AUKUS first came into being, obviously the Chinese system doesn't like it because these are formidable assets. That's why Australia is acquiring them; it enhances our national security capabilities. But at the same time, as I said before, measure that against the extraordinary growth in in China's broad naval and specific submarine capabilities over the last half a century, including bringing 10 new subs into, not just production, but into deployment over the last five years since we've been engaged in the AUKUS debate from the get-go. So you know, let's put all these things into context.
Sarah Ferguson
It's been confirmed after Pat Conroy on this program raised doubts that there will be a rotation of U.S. subs at the Stirling Naval Base in WA into the future. Does that make Stirling a significant potential target for the Chinese military?
Kevin Rudd
Look, I think it's irresponsible for anyone -- particularly someone who's previously served as prime minister or foreign minister or ambassador of the United States -- to comment on the nuclear targeting program of either the Russian Federation or the Chinese. The bottom line is, our job as Australia, is to ensure that we enhance our own national security over time. We live in a highly volatile region, the Indo-Pacific. We need greater naval capabilities in order to sustain our own national interests, and that's where these assets of ours are important additions to Australia's overall defense capabilities. Obviously, the Chinese system would prefer that we were not heading in that direction. You can see that from the official commentary. But the bottom line is, if we were to listen to everything that Chinese official commentary had said about Australia's defense capabilities, including our alliance with the United States over the last half century, then we'd be doing nothing. Our job is to defend Australia and to look after Australian national interests. This helps in us doing that.
Sarah Ferguson
You've just come out of this role as ambassador to Washington, so you've had a lot of insight into the way Americans, the American administration, is thinking about AUKUS. What are their expectations about the access they will get to those submarines in the future, and bases in the future? What do they think they're getting in return?
Kevin Rudd
Well, the United States -- as it operates a global military operation, and is wedded to a strategy of deterrence as it relates to China over Taiwan, but also has broader national security roles and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific -- obviously has interests in its allies being able to provide support where we can. Australia's posture with the United States for a very long period of time has been: we don't operate American bases; we operate joint facilities such as at Pine Gap, from which we obtain enormous intelligence value for Australia's national security needs, but we also have other rotational force arrangements -- such as the one which I had a lot to do with when I was prime minister and foreign minister, the Marine Rotational Force in the Northern Territory -- and similarly, we'll have rotational arrangements by U.S. submarines in and out of HMAS Stirling and making use of the new facilities at Henderson. These will be a rolling set of flexible arrangements, as you would expect between close treaty allies such as Australia and the United States. And I'm sure that's going to be to both our countries' national security advantage. Certainly, the United States have a big interest there in having operational access. We have a big interest in being able to deploy our boats with American boats to effectively and most effectively be able to use these new assets for the Royal Australian Navy as well.
Sarah Ferguson
But how are future governments going to get round the issue of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which forbids nuclear weapons on Australian soil, when U.S. boats from as early as 2032 will be carrying tactical nuclear weapons?
Kevin Rudd
Well, the United States is fully familiar with the provisions of Rarotonga. It's been around for a very long period of time, 40 years, and they are acutely conscious of Australian policy as it relates to that. These things are handled on a rolling bilateral basis. We've done so, given that the United States has long had nuclear-armed or -powered vessels operating in and out of our part of the world over the last 40 years, and we will continue to do so in the future. Where Rarotonga comes into force, in particular, is the solemn obligations that we have as treaty partners to ensure that devices are not tested in the Pacific region. That, of course, reflects back to the historical problems we have with French nuclear testing -- thank God that's now a thing of the past -- but it's also mindful of ensuring that the Pacific Island states, all 16 of them, including Australia and New Zealand, are able to sustain this as an effective region within which nuclear testing doesn't occur in the future, and the other protocols of the treaty are adhered to as well. We can do that as we've done so in the past.
Sarah Ferguson
Let's step away from the official line. I want to ask you something slightly more personal. We often learn a lot more from our failures than we do from our successes. What did you learn from your defeats as Prime Minister of Australia that informed your approach as the ambassador?
Kevin Rudd
Look, we always reflect on our lives, but thank you for the curveball question at the end of this discussion, Sarah. Look, none of us are perfect in life. Albo's not perfect, I'm not perfect, none of the conservative prime ministers have been perfect. We all make mistakes. The key thing is not to pretend that you're some sort of perfect leader or perfect human being, and when you recognize that there are things to change, that you do so. All of us do that, and dare I say it, even journalists do that, or at least the grown-up and mature ones do, in the way in which they approach their job. I'm no different. But in, for example, executing my recent responsibilities as ambassador, it's been really important to work closely with the Australian government team, to work with the embassy team. We've done that well. I think I was effective as the embassy's leader of some 250-300 staff, and the acquisition of leadership skills over time is an ongoing business. Teams are critical. Marshaling those teams effectively is critical. And I think in my recent role I've done that, you know, reasonably well. History will be the judge.
Sarah Ferguson
And just briefly, what lessons is China going to draw from U.S. errors in Iran, kind of looping back to where we started about potential danger over Taiwan. Looking at Iran, what lessons are they drawing about the U.S. from what's happened there?
Kevin Rudd
Well, there's often a saying within Chinese political circles about the United States, which is, whenever the U.S. gets really serious about the China strategic and military and economic challenge, don't worry, our old friend will always come back. Then you ask, well, who's our old friend? And they say the Middle East, of course -- 老朋友中东. And so when they look at Iran, they see that in the context of what happened in the past with Iraq and earlier, of course, with Afghanistan, and against the central defining strategic challenge of the 21st century, which is: which power will emerge as the center of the global geopolitical and geoeconomic order over the course of the next half century? The Chinese will look at Iran and say this has been a useful distraction from our perspective. I think more broadly, they will look at it also and say: what has this done in terms of U.S. magazine depth, the availability of its own ammunition and supplies against future Indo-Pacific contingencies? And they'll also look at the political reaction within the United States, which is one which becomes increasingly exhausted with foreign wars, and particularly ones which the United States itself has initiated. So the Chinese will take, in strategic terms, overall comfort, in my judgment, as an analyst, from what they have seen in terms of U.S. posture over Iran.
Sarah Ferguson
You've been one of the most consequential Australian diplomats for years. You are now free of the constraints of being an ambassador. What can you tell us about Donald Trump that you couldn't tell us then?
Kevin Rudd
Well, President Trump is an interesting sort of fellow to deal with. I mean, as you know, we had a few exchanges on live global television during Prime Minister Albanese's visit to the U.S. last October. But by and large, I mean, if you are focused about the national interests that you wish to advance with the U.S. administration, as we have been with AUKUS, as we have been with critical minerals, as we have been with trade, as we have been with critical technologies, you can make progress because the administration is wider, deeper, and broader than the White House itself. We've had excellent engagements with Secretary Bessent of the Treasury, with Secretary Rubio, and also the Defense Secretary and Under Secretary for Defense Policy Colby as well. We get things done. The President has his own unique political style, and it can be deeply diverting and distracting for some. The challenge of Australian government, of all governments, in dealing with administration is not to be distracted by that, but to prosecute your interests and do it as effectively as you can, and to manage. And by the way, I mean we've had this important relationship with the United States for more than 100 years. President Trump's term in office will last another two years. We need to take a long historical view of this as well.
Sarah Ferguson
And just finally, you're from Queensland. Could you have anticipated 30 years ago that Pauline Hanson would be outpolling your own party in government and the opposition coalition?
Kevin Rudd
Well, it's very easy to play the politics of protest. It's very hard to do the the grinding business of government, which looks after practical problems of national security, such as you and I have been discussing here this evening, of the economy and growing it, environmental sustainability, so that we don't all exhaust and expire the planet through climate change, and delivering, you know, basic services for the Australian people, including housing affordability, which has been eating away so badly at people's standard of living over a long period of time. The hard business of government is to come up with practical responses to each of those challenges. The easy business of politics is simply to act as a protest vector, and then lace it and spice it with the politics of race. That's what Ms. Hanson's been doing ever since she emerged in my fair state of Queensland a quarter of a century ago. Her script hasn't changed, but ask this question of yourselves: What single answer does she have to any of the list of problems and challenges which I went through before? 'Zip' is the answer to that.
Sarah Ferguson
Kevin Rudd, thank you very much indeed for joining us.
Kevin Rudd
Good to be with you.
ENDS