Managing the rise of a more assertive China - Hindustan Times

On August 2, Speaker of the United States (US) House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan in the first visit by a United States (US) official of her level in 25 years. Prior to the visit, Chinese officials had warned that if Pelosi did indeed visit the island, it would violate the One-China policy and lead to an escalation in the Taiwan Strait. Pelosi’s visit gave China an excuse to do exactly that: It conducted a large-scale blockade of Taiwan, simulated an attack on its offshore islands, and fired five Dongfeng missiles close to Japan – a provocative step which, significantly, did not engender a military response. A much more provocative Beijing is likely going to be the new normal going forward, especially as Beijing believes that the US is moving away from its One-China policy.

China has now embarked on an aggressive diplomatic campaign to get countries to reinforce their commitment to the One-China policy. In South Asia, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have all voiced their support for the One-China policy. However, despite requests from Beijing to do so, India has not referenced the One-China policy since at least 2010, which stems in part from Beijing’s unwillingness to respect India’s territory along their shared border.

Since April 2020, Indian and Chinese troops have been locked in a standoff with one another, with 16 rounds of negotiations failing to reach a successful conclusion. This includes the fatal Galwan Valley clash in June 2020 where 20 Indian soldiers died as did an unknown number of Chinese soldiers. External affairs minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has described India-China ties as “going through an extremely difficult phase because of what China did on the border.”

China’s actions have also caused India to further embrace like-minded partners such as the US, Japan, and Australia. India has become more willing to be a more public part of Quad. For India, this embrace of Quad has coincided with a renewed focus on Tibet, which plays a central role in China’s relationship with India. Since the current border flare ups began in 2020, this has included more willingness by the Government of India to engage with the Dalai Lama, as well as greater attention to the border areas and military preparedness.

There remains a fundamental question though: What is driving this more assertive China and what does this mean for India? Xi Jinping’s assertiveness can be linked to rising Chinese nationalism and the sharpening of the country’s national ambitions.

As I argued in my recent book The Avoidable War, one of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s core interests is the unity and territorial integrity of the motherland. This includes maintaining firm control over Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong, driven in part by Chinese history, which has always been kind to those who have held the empire together and unforgiving to those who have allowed it to fall apart. Xi is no different here: he wants to see China surpass the US as the world’s largest economy and see the return of Taiwan to Beijing’s sovereignty.

So as with Taiwan, China’s concerns about Tibet and the border dispute with India are not going to fade away any time soon. A bill introduced in the US House of Representatives in July that would make it US policy that the Tibetan people have a right to self-determination under international law will only agitate Beijing even more. Beijing is now planning to invest more than $30 billion into developing infrastructure in Tibet. This includes the G695 highway, which will be built close to the Line of Actual Control and could be utilised for a quick mobilisation of troops to multiple parts of the border with India.

India should expect continued assertiveness from Beijing. Though Beijing has been seeking to engage New Delhi more frequently and was able to secure Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) summit, at this stage it appears unlikely that Beijing will offer any concessions on the border question.

And with the Chinese Communist Party convening the 20th Party Congress later this year, nationalist sentiment will be on full display from all levels of government. Xi will gain a third term in office. And he will not be predisposed to compromise on what he perceives to be his core interests, including the territorial integrity of the motherland. Indeed, we are likely to see a progressive hardening of Chinese policy toward Taiwan.

Although in the absence of an unintended, accidental crisis it is unlikely that Xi would be in a position to comfortably launch military actions against Taipei until the early 2030s, by which time China hopes to have achieved a decisive military, economic and technological advantage over Taiwan’s principal strategic backer, the US, the open question for Delhi is: How will China approach its border dispute with India if or when a conflict begins over Taiwan? And how would India respond?

Kevin Rudd is the global president of the Asia Society and a former prime minister of Australia. He is the author of The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China, which is being launched in Mumbai and Delhi this week .