The challenges facing the next generation
GR: You were at the Oxford Union on Friday night. Let me ask two questions. First, Oxford and Harvard: which do you prefer? And secondly, for people who don’t follow the China issue as much, what are the two or three things they should know that you told the folks at the Union?
KR: Well, on Oxford and Harvard, I prefer the Australian National University. But you’d expect me to say that.
It’s great to be back here at Harvard, at the Kennedy School and at the Belfer Center, which have been very welcoming to me over the years, ever since I first came to this country as a political refugee after coming second in one of our national elections. That means I lost.
It was fun talking to the Oxford Union. I’ve spoken to the Union a few times now, and I was talking to the bright-eyed and bushy-tailed young people there about the cracking of the political centre across the democratic world. It doesn’t matter whether it’s here, in Germany, in Britain, in France with Le Pen, or even prospectively in my own country.
What do we do about the cracking up of the centre of the democratic project, as our institutions are tested and begin to look fragile? Look at the streets of Paris.
At the same time, we’re relying upon those institutions to enable us to wrestle to the ground these huge macro challenges washing over all our shores.
On geopolitics, there is the great strategic competition between China and the United States: which country and which culture will end up as the fulcrum of the unfolding international order for the 21st century?
There is the great geoeconomic challenge, often less spoken of, which is debt, debt and debt: the extent to which we can sustain our levels of global indebtedness without triggering another global financial crisis. I was elected as prime minister as we entered the last one. I remember what it’s like. That’s when my hair turned white. It used to be brown. If we have another one, it’ll fall out.
The third is geotechnology: the rise and rise of artificial intelligence, sweeping all sectors of our society and economy simultaneously, and our pedagogy, as you know here at Harvard. How do we maximise the upside while protecting, to the extent that we can, against the risks on the downside, including the security risk of frontier-model agentic AI acting autonomously?
Then there is this quiet, slow, continuing challenge which ravages the planet each day, called climate change, whether it’s politically correct to refer to it as such in this country or not. Watch the glacial collapse in Nepal and China, and ask yourself whether the planet is warming. It is.
What I was talking to the guys and girls at Oxford about was this dual set of challenges: the institutions of democratic government being fractured from within, with working families and working people unable to afford a dignified life and thereby retreating to the politics of the far right, populist and often racist extremism, or to the far left; and at the same time having to drive that car — i.e. a faltering democratic state — to deal with these macro challenges sweeping over all of us.
I said to the generation at Oxford, and I’d say the same to this generation of bright young things here at Harvard: I think you will face both the opportunity and the challenge of becoming, yet again, another “greatest generation”.
I’m not predicting war for you all, like the greatest generation who prevailed in the last world war. But I have not seen such a wicked set of challenges unfolding simultaneously as I see today.
Now, on your second question, Graham, in terms of key bits of knowledge, I’m a bit of an old-fashioned guy. If you want to understand China, and you’re here at Harvard College or at the Kennedy School, wrapping your head around the language helps. It really does help.
When the Fairbank Center here at Harvard was established in the postwar decades, it was about creating an Asia-literate generation of young Americans — and an East Asia-literate generation in particular — who could become the foreign service officers and senior public officials of the United States. That remains an imperative to this day.
Despite AI’s auto-translate, there’s no substitute for being able to deploy the language effectively as a door, a tool, to understand the way in which the other thinks — in this case, the People’s Republic of China — whether you’re American or from anywhere else in the world.
Finding your policy passion
GR: Let me stay on that and get you to drill a little further. You’re a freshman at the college or a first-year public policy student, thinking about your career. Tell us a little about your own odyssey and what lessons you draw from it, including about language.
Kevin has many claims to fame, one of which is that he speaks Mandarin better than most Chinese leaders. I’ve been in a meeting with a person who works directly for Xi Jinping, watching Kevin speak and seeing that person look very envious. He doesn’t look Chinese exactly. He’s certainly certifiably Australian, and when he talks in English you can tell.
But he mastered Mandarin. That served you well in becoming a foreign service officer, foreign minister, prime minister and ambassador. Give us a little career advice.
KR: I’ve tried to master three languages: English, Chinese and Australian. Australian is often incomprehensible for our American cousins, but we try our best.
All I did as a kid growing up in rural Australia was form a pretty basic view that China would be huge in our country’s future. That’s all. Therefore, if you wanted to understand this unfolding phenomenon, language was a tool to open those doors.
I did effectively five years of modern Chinese language, classical Chinese language and Chinese history — what we used to call in the old days the “Yao to Mao” course. Yao and Shun were the legendary founders of China in mythological times, through to Mao, as in Mao Zedong. We started around 2000 BC with the Xia dynasty and moved through to the People’s Republic over five years.
The pedagogy was first class, and there’s never been a day, in whatever career I’ve had, when I haven’t drawn on elements of that learning in what I do in daily life.
But as you know from your own career, Graham, it’s never just an even trajectory. You end up doing a range of things. When I graduated, back in the early Mesolithic period — Graham’s a Palaeolith, I’m Mesolithic — we were largely unemployable in those days in the ’80s.
Someone said, “Why don’t you join the foreign service?” Coming from rural Australia, I said, “What’s that?” I then had to be told how you applied. To my great surprise, I was selected. I knew nobody. That’s a great testament to meritocracy.
I was completely stunned. There you go: you’ve got a job and get to travel the world. I’m a Chinese speaker, and pretty good by that stage, so they sent me to Sweden. Go figure.
Then I reached a point as a foreign service officer where I got tired of writing reports for an audience of 50 or 100 people and asking myself the existential question: have I moved the dial? Have I changed policy? Have I brought about a material result? I found myself utterly dispirited.
So I leapt off for the first time into politics and became the chief of staff to what you would call in this country a state governor. At the tender age of 30, I was running the bureaucracy of a state, a bit like Georgia in the Australian context. Then I went to the House of Representatives, and one thing led to another.
I suppose I’d say to everyone here: it’s never completely linear. It is in multiple directions. But the important thing is what lights up your policy passion, what lights up your political passion, what lights up your personal passion.
My wife Thérèse, whom Graham’s met, is a psychologist. She always says: that which you are naturally interested in, you’re going to be best at, as opposed to that which you think you should do because it’s the right thing to do.
I’ve had multiple roles, but the underlying theme of how we prevent these two-thousand-pound gorillas, the United States and China, from blowing their brains out, and the rest of us along with them, has been the enduring project.
Managing strategic competition
GR: Back to the two or three major points that a freshman, a first-year public policy student or the rest of us should know about the China challenge. The conventional wisdom, which I believe is correct, is that the rise of China and its impact on the international order will be the defining international issue for the lifetime of students here.
There are two books by Kevin I would recommend. One is about avoiding war. If we don’t succeed in doing that, you won’t have to worry about any other problems. The other is about Xi Jinping’s thought. It’s not simply thinking about China: today you have to think about Xi Jinping’s China. He’s not only the CEO, the chief executive officer; he’s the COE, the chief of everything.
What are the things people should get started on if they’re going to live in a world in which China is the defining international challenge?
KR: Let me go to three. One is the underlying reality of the strategic competition which exists. Two: can strategic competition be managed, or are we destined for it to be unmanaged and therefore utterly volatile, presenting the rolling risk of crisis, conflict and war? Thirdly: how does AI change the game, or does it not?
On the first, the nature of the strategic competition, you will hear people in the United States and China piously say in public forums: “We’re not engaged in strategic competition with each other. We are simply doing our own thing.” Pigs might fly.
The reality is that within the US system and the Chinese system, there is a full-blown strategic competition underway in every dimension of national power and influence: militarily, economically, in trade and investment and technology, in foreign policy, in ideology. It’s across the world. Everything, everywhere, all at once, as the movie said.
The reason it’s going on is because China, given its history, seeks to bring about, as Xi Jinping said just after he came to office, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people”. That’s what he wants.
Against the backdrop of China’s recent history, particularly its 19th-century history and the first half of the 20th century, there is an enormous drive for that to occur.
It’s therefore about which of these two powers becomes the fulcrum for the unfolding international order.
The second thing people looking at this for the first time may wish to reflect on is: if that is the nature of the beast, can you manage it in a way which reduces the risk of it erupting into war?
That’s the burden of The Avoidable War. It outlines a concept of managed strategic competition. Without being self-indulgent about it, you see some of this language and conceptual framework reflected in both Xi Jinping’s and the current US president’s framing of the relationship.
The Chinese call it “constructive strategic stability”, and the Americans, through Trump, have by and large accepted that frame. When you parse it into its constituent elements, it’s about cooperation being the main thread, as the Chinese would say; competition within bounds; and managing fundamental strategic differences — Taiwan, but we won’t mention that explicitly, will we? If you do that, we have stability. That’s the Chinese frame, which the Americans have broadly accepted.
I put it slightly differently. Point one of managed strategic competition is: how do you understand and, to the maximal extent possible, respect each other’s underlying strategic red lines? The biggest conflictual point is the management of Taiwan.
Two: in all other domains, compete the hell out of each other, so long as it doesn’t become kinetic. China and the United States currently engage in a massive competition about who wins the AI race. Let it unfold.
Three: are there still domains where these two countries can effectively collaborate and cooperate? The answer must be yes: the next pandemic; climate, once America returns to this table; and bilateral guardrails around, let’s call it for the moment, dangerous AI.
That’s the conceptual framework of managed strategic competition.
How artificial intelligence changes the equation
KR: Finally, there’s a third thing to focus on, particularly those of you just starting at the college or beginning your graduate courses. If that’s a frame, where does artificial intelligence fit in the guts of it?
Xi Jinping’s theory of artificial intelligence is fascinating for those who follow the Chinese debates. It’s called “new quality productive forces”. If you look carefully at the ideological literature and the party’s theoretical journals, including articles written by Xi himself, he sees this set of technologies as radically transforming China’s ability to compete and then leapfrog the US, the West and the rest. That’s in their literature, so let’s not pretend it’s not.
What does Donald Trump say? “He who wins AI wins.” That’s what President Trump said on the eve of the most recent summit.
What I would encourage students of these complex questions to focus on is understanding the dynamics of strategic competition. It’s real. Wrap your head around the management mechanisms for it. These are also real and cogent. They are now being applied in part, though I think this is a temporary management mechanism at present rather than a long-term one.
Third, does AI unconstrained blow the whole show up? Or is there a come-to-Jesus, come-to-Marx moment, whereby they work out that frontier-model agentic AI autonomously attacking each other’s infrastructure and systems is dangerous: social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, financial infrastructure, the security of the banking system, political infrastructure, military infrastructure?
There was an attack recently, and a great scooping out of information from the PLA using an OpenAI model. It caused a come-to-Marx moment in Beijing, let me tell you.
These are the three domains I would encourage people to read about, think about and reach conclusions on.
China’s changing economic model
GR: Let me push you further on something we were discussing at the China Working Group earlier today. You characterised Xi Jinping’s and the Chinese government’s techno-industrial policy: identifying technologies that will constitute the commanding heights of the future, applying the China strategy, and pretty soon becoming the predominant producer in that space.
You could look at solar, EVs, biotech and otherwise. In Australia, you were very involved in trying to develop the production of rare earth materials and magnets as a competitor. But if the Chinese system is working as it is, can anybody compete with that on a level playing field?
KR: I think there’s been a fundamental transformation, Graham, in China’s macroeconomic model, or more precisely its economic development model.
From China’s accession to the WTO through to about 2012, you saw a China increasingly integrated into the global economy, based around broad market principles, imperfectly adhered to, and often relying on the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms when conflicts arose.
What did that orthodoxy generate? A decade and a half of double-digit growth for the economy writ large.
What we’ve seen in the last decade or so under Xi Jinping is a conclusion that this reliance on the market economy — to paraphrase what he said at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 — was producing unbalanced and unfair development. There’s a big ideological rupture in China’s economic model around the mid-teens, somewhere between 2015 and 2017.
One reflection of that has been the Made in China 2025 strategy, launched in 2015, where Xi Jinping said that to compete effectively against the US, the West and the rest in the future, we need to dominate the technology stack, not just the AI stack.
If you look at the 10 technology targets he announced in 2015, we all looked at them and said, “By God, that’s ambitious.” Where is China on biotechnology? Information technology? New materials research? Aeronautical engineering and jet engines? Renewable energy? They’re all listed.
After 10 years, if you did the report card on where China got to against that techno-industrial strategy, you would have to award Xi Jinping seven out of 10. Frankly, they went from nowhere to somewhere big in the space of a decade.
With artificial intelligence, what you see in China’s medium- to long-term technology plan is an absolute determination to do the same across the AI stack, including compute and semiconductors, where China is probably now four or five years behind the US.
Then there is the determination to do the same in quantum and nuclear fusion: the two huge game changers of the future, both in terms of energy and what quantum does to compute and AI writ large.
For a nation with an engineering culture, turbocharged by a Marxist-Leninist ideology which holds that these material factors of production can be driven hard through the interventions of a Leninist party to turbocharge aggregate economic success against the US, the West and the rest, that’s the strategy.
Can we compete against it? China has declared a global techno-industrial strategy. Because of Xi Jinping’s parallel concern about national security, and therefore national economic security, and his aim of making China invulnerable to external assault at a time of crisis, the resolution is for China to dominate each production chain in technology, advanced manufacturing and general manufacturing.
China now represents a third of global manufacturing output. By 2030, on current trajectories, it’ll be at least 40 per cent, and rising.
The rest of the world is saying this is too much. The United States, for a decade now, has started pulling up the tariff wall against what it has concluded to be subsidised Chinese exports to the rest of the world, taking out manufacturing across the US, the West and increasingly Southeast Asia.
Will the Europeans now act? Will the Southeast Asians act? The big growth driver at present in the Chinese economy, given the enormous resource concentration in this techno-industrial strategy, is net exports.
For those reasons, I think we’re on something of an economic collision course, and there will need to be some correction by the Chinese economic system. Otherwise, the vulnerability everyone collectively signs up to is that whatever you need in the future can only be delivered through the Chinese global factory. That is a risk China would not accept for itself, and nor will the collective democratic world accept for itself.
Innovation subsidies and the power of scale
GR: One more footnote on that. Part of the story is Chinese subsidies to companies for production. But I’ve been drilling down on this, and I’m suspicious about how important that is.
Take Elon and the production of Teslas. There’s a plant in Shanghai and a plant in Texas. They produce the same car. One is half the price of the other for production. How can that be?
You go through the various items: how much does it cost to get a part? How long does it take? How long does it take to get a permit? How much does electricity cost? Down the list. But I see the same two cars, and one is produced at half the price of the other.
If they have created a manufacturing and production ecosystem that produces everything at half the price of the competitors, it can’t be that everything will be made in China, but it could be a whole lot. Take us another step or two down that road.
KR: It’s an excellent question. One: if there is a Western or American view that China is incapable of indigenous innovation, that view is so passé that it doesn’t pass any empirical test of China’s innovative capabilities today.
Two: China does subsidise, and by multiple mechanisms. The principal one is financial subsidy through preferential soft loans and negligible taxation. The soft loans are often provided by local banks, which pay 1 per cent interest on deposits.
The Chinese people have no opportunity to put their deposits elsewhere. You can’t speculate in the housing market anymore, because the housing market has collapsed and is six years into recession domestically.
Then the government comes along and says: “We want you, the local bank, to provide an indefinite soft loan to these companies operating in our locality, because we are going to be assessed from above by the central leadership in terms of our ability to grow globally active firms in each of these key technology sectors.” That’s the message which goes down to local party secretaries. That’s the ecosystem at play.
You would think that if China were continuing to move up the value chain, it would abandon elementary production, basic production or non-advanced manufacturing. Except it’s not. It’s staying active in being the world’s best sock producer, as well as the world’s best and most efficient satellite producer.
That creates general grumpiness in the Global South, because it crowds out the ability of other emerging economies to move their way through the production chain and the economic development chain.
The problem for the rest of the world is this. Two things happened in 1776. You guys had a revolution. You got grumpy with the Brits. I can understand that. We’re Australian. We never had a revolution. We thought it would disturb the weekend, so we gradually reformed our way into independence. It was a less tidy process, but we got there in the end.
The other thing that happened in 1776 is that Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations and articulated core principles of price theory: supply, demand, markets, ultimately dictating the most rational allocation of resources in a market economy. That became the overall doctrine of neoclassical economics, which by and large dominated the world for the next 250 years: Britain, America and the rest.
Except one thing, Graham. Adam Smith, who probably didn’t have much of a sense of humour — he was a Scot; any Scots here that I’ve offended? There were plenty at the Oxford Union — didn’t conceive of a single economic actor, a party-state, acting as a monopolistic supplier and a monopsonistic purchaser in the global economy.
That is the absolute power of the Chinese techno-industrial model, which is why countries around the world are resorting to their own industrial strategies to respond in order to survive. That is where we are at the moment.
The principle, in both China and the rest, is: with scale, you prevail.
What the rest of the world is now thinking through, in response to the overwhelming power of this Chinese techno-industrial strategy, driven by its own innovation, aided by its own subsidisation and its continued access to global markets, is whether the rest of the world needs to act in unison to prevent this from dominating manufacturing across the world.
Will the European Union, for example, join the Trans-Pacific Partnership economies of Asia and the Pacific in creating a combined entity to protect itself? If that happens, you join the EU economies with what’s called the TPP-11, everywhere from Japan down to Australia.
What happens if democratic India joins as well? All are under the same parallel sets of pressures. Add those three economic entities together: do you begin to see the emergence of a critical economic mass capable of providing an alternative to the onslaught of the Chinese economic model? Those are the dynamics currently underway.
GR: That would naturally lead to a question about whether there are any other economic actors who might or might not be part of such an arrangement. You mean the US of A?
KR: I’m just assuming America’s out to lunch on this stuff, because trade’s not fashionable unless you’re exporting.
If the rest of the world and those three large entities were to come together — and there are dynamics at work in all capitals on these subjects, driven by the exigencies of the Chinese techno-industrial strategy — post-2028, what does America do?
Or do you end up with three parallel blocs: effectively the Chinese bloc, the democratic world bloc, and Uncle Sam trying to decide on its future?
What does China want to change
Audience question: You talk about competition and how to win. What is it that we’re competing for? China’s objective seems to be to rejuvenate the nation. Taken at face value, that doesn’t seem too much of a cause for concern if the objective is to be respected by the world. Is there any indication China wants more than that, that it’s going towards world domination, which gives us cause for concern?
KR: It’s a really good question, because we need to look at a spectrum of possibilities and probabilities here.
National rejuvenation, if you’re the leadership of China, is a perfectly legitimate objective, given China’s recent economic and political history: centuries of division, centuries of weakness, and many centuries of poverty and acute poverty. If you compare the lot of a poor peasant in rural Hunan at the time of the civil war in the late ’40s with that person’s life today, you’d say, “My lot has improved considerably.” That’s point one.
Two: Xi Jinping is not a status quo leader. He wishes to resolve the fundamental unresolved question of geopolitics, which is reunification with Taiwan. That’s clear from his declaratory statements. Similarly, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the disputed islands with Japan, the disputed islands with Korea, and the Sino-Indian border.
These are not status quo propositions. These are changing boundaries. Once you change boundaries by military force or the threat of military force, reactions ensue.
Beyond that, China’s declaratory policy is also that the US system of security alliances in the world, both in Europe and certainly in the Indo-Pacific, are outdated relics of the Cold War and should be dismantled. That’s not the view among the allies, by the way, but that is China’s desire to change the security architecture in the region.
Furthermore, China is now the dominant economic power by a country mile across the Indo-Pacific, and second only to the United States in terms of aggregate military capabilities. That’s a measurable empirical fact.
The final element is the future of the order writ large. Study carefully the foundational documents Xi Jinping has released over the last decade: the Global Civilization Initiative, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Governance Initiative, and, if you want some infrastructure, the Belt and Road Initiative.
All have a common principle: a new global order which increasingly has China at its centre, with Chinese interests and values more respected at its centre.
On the question of status quo versus change, we need to think carefully across that spectrum of changes which the Chinese are quite clear about in their official literature. That is different from saying, “I, China, am going to invade New Zealand tomorrow.” That is not part of the Chinese cultural, national or even ideological DNA. But these other things I’ve referred to are material changes.
The role of middle powers
Audience question: There are a lot of middle powers which would like not to have to choose between the US and China. Some are thinking they can play an active role in getting the two to become friendlier and reduce competition, so they can benefit from being friends with both. Is there a possible future where US–China competition doesn’t exist, or is much reduced? Or is that a pipe dream?
KR: I wish there wasn’t a binary strategic competition underway. But because of the nature of the two systems, ideologically and ideationally, plus the history of international relations, which Graham has traced in his book over the last half-millennium or so, this is the nature of the beast: strategic competition.
Hence, I always go back to the second proposition. Can we manage it in a manner which is more stabilising than would otherwise be the case? In history, when there’s been no management mechanism, it has usually ended disastrously.
The reason I wrote a book called The Avoidable War is because this bloke wrote a book called Destined for War. We are friends and colleagues and have been for more than a decade. I thought we needed some different branding and labelling.
You referred to middle powers. Whether it’s creative powers, constructive powers or middle powers, the literature in international relations theory is quite rich. Singapore, for example, is an exemplar of what constructive powers can do, even though it’s a small country. There are other microstates which take leadership on a range of issues in the international order.
But on the fundamental security question underpinning international relations, my melancholy duty is to inform you that this ultimately involves certain binary choices between China and the United States, however much we may want that not to be the case.
Second, however, listen very carefully to Prime Minister Carney’s address at Davos in January this year on middle powers being active in creating alternative orders in the international community. There is agency for powers great and small to construct alternative economic orders. I referred to the possibility of one such order before: the Europeans, the Trans-Pacific Partnership economies, the Indians.
Third, there is agency and possibility for these countries to look at governance models for artificial intelligence as it affects them. The market for artificial intelligence, frontier models and diffusion currently being constructed in China and the United States, and diffused across the world, will have to deal with governance structures in the rest of the world.
If we wish to reduce the risks of autonomously acting agentic AI, there is agency for middle powers to do that.
The final thing is that I’m still a pretty old-fashioned multilateralist. We invented the United Nations in 1945 not because we were creating heaven on earth, but because we were creating a system capable of managing a whole range of international challenges, if not all of them, to benefit humanity.
The role for middle powers and others in the UN system is to use their resources, capability and budgetary resources to backstop these agencies: the World Food Programme, UNICEF, UN OCHA, the UNFCCC on climate, or the World Trade Organization, which still runs, under the most-favoured-nation principle, 90 per cent of the world’s trade. Continue to prop them up at a time when the United States is withdrawing from them.
These are practical areas of what I describe as state activism, from creative and constructive powers as well as middle powers.
Deterrence and preventing war
Audience question: What is the one thing we can do to avoid war? What is the one thing we can do to end war? And what is the one thing we can do to create lasting peace?
KR: I’m not the Pope, so on the last one — we do like Pope Bob!
I’ll go to the first part of your question: how do you best prevent war? It’s old-fashioned, but if you accept the reality of strategic competition and unresolved security dilemmas such as Taiwan, the essential ingredient is the three Ds: deterrence, deterrence, deterrence.
We may be critics of what has happened in the nuclear domain since Hiroshima, but deterrence has worked across the better part of 80 years. This is no small thing.
Applied in the conventional domain, but across all categories of weaponry, deterrence as it relates to stability in East Asia and the West Pacific is the name of the game.
People have asked me, “What the hell does deterrence mean?” Here is my lay rendition. It’s the Kevin Rudd thesis. It’s called SMTX. Sounds really scientific. We have a natural bent in that direction as Australians. SMTX means the shaving mirror test of Xi.
I’m Xi Jinping. I’m having a shave in the morning and looking in the mirror, thinking: Taiwan, can I resolve this militarily? Simultaneously, we’d like the little voice in the left ear or the right ear saying, “Not yet, comrade. It’s still too risky.” That’s what deterrence is.
As soon as you reach a point where you conclude that a matter can be resolved unilaterally militarily, deterrence has failed.
It is unromantic. I’m not saying everyone has a seminar at a UN-sponsored conference and feels warm and cuddly towards each other at the end. I’m saying that if you’re sitting in the Central Military Commission in Beijing, the Pentagon in the United States, or the Ministry of National Defense in Taipei, the reality or absence of effective deterrence shapes whether we can continue with strategic stability and peace.
I’ll leave it to the Holy Father in terms of how we turn that into a permanent peace.
GR: Let me add one footnote. It’s a great question, and way too little discussed in the current American and international security context.
The idea that we’re living today in the 80th, 81st year without a great-power war is an amazing thing. This is the longest period without great-power war since the Roman Empire. It’s a feature of an international order built mainly by American leadership after World War II, by people who had lived through it, realised how catastrophic it was, and were determined that they were on the wrong course.
Henry Stimson, a distinguished Harvard Law School graduate, had been secretary of war in World War II. He had actually been secretary of war in World War I. In one generation, we’d gone from 25 million people killed in World War I to 50 million in World War II, and were on a path that would normally have led to a genuinely catastrophic war in another generation. Because people built an international order, we’ve had the good fortune to live our whole lives without that.
That order, as Kevin has described, has been sagging. As the Munich security people put it this past year, we’ve entered an era of wrecking-ball international politics, in which the great irony is that the principal architect and builder of the order appears to be the wrecking ball.
Kevin’s book on the avoidable war is part of what should be a much broader effort. There are lots of places in the world where there’s conflict which could have been prevented. Conflict prevention, which used to be a big idea in renovating the order built after World War II, has now become a sideshow.
There’s a great opportunity for the next generation to think about how we build and sustain an international order that doesn’t have recurring conflicts with catastrophic consequences.
KR: My footnote to Graham’s footnote is that in maintaining peace and stability, which is core to everything else, the concept of deterrence is mutual.
It is not just American and allied deterrence against China changing the map militarily in Taiwan and the rest of East Asia. That is one aspect. The Chinese term for deterrence, 威慑, is also mutually applicable: China deterring the United States and those on Taiwan from unilaterally changing Taiwan’s political status. It’s a mutual concept.
GR: I’m not disagreeing with the deterrence point. I’m putting it in a broader context.
If you wander around the park down here, at the entrances you’ll see columns with quotations from the fellow for whom this school is named, John F. Kennedy. There’s a wonderful one about the twilight struggle against the common enemies of mankind: poverty, disease, and ultimately war. A good place to work on.
Understanding Xi Jinping’s worldview
Audience question: Your book refers to “Xi Jinping’s China”, indicating that his ideology has a huge impact on China’s future trajectory, US–China relations and the world. What are the principal elements affecting that ideology: ancient Chinese civilisation, unification, political legitimacy, the century of humiliation, Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, or a more pragmatic approach?
KR: Having been a political leader myself, I can say this: we’re not monochrome. When you ask why country X did this to country Y, there is rarely a single answer. We need to reflect on that reality.
Secondly, I’ve had the benefit of quite a number of conversations with President Xi Jinping over a number of years, in different capacities. If you ask what ultimately drives him, I’m not a psychologist. I’m an analyst.
I also like a glass of red wine, and so did he at the time. I’m Australian, and he was in my residence in Canberra. It was a winter’s night, with a roaring log fire burning intensely, and we talked a lot about Chinese history, because that’s my shtick as well. That’s the thing I know best.
I’d say two or three things. One: he is a Chinese leader, deeply animated by a historical worldview of China’s place at home, in the region and in the world. If you’re a student of Chinese historiography, from the classical historians of Sima Qian down to the present, there is a notion of China’s intrinsic greatness in its history and its civilisational continuity.
Is that a factor in China’s contemporary political psychology? Of course it is. That’s the reality.
There’s a second driving factor, which is why I wrote on Xi Jinping’s ideological worldview: he’s a Marxist-Leninist too. For people who think Marxism-Leninism and ideology don’t matter in China, they haven’t quite got the memo. Xi Jinping would spend probably 20 per cent of his time on ideological questions, judging by the totality of his writings on these questions.
Within Marxism-Leninism, what does it mean? A view of historical materialism, dialectical materialism, about the machinery of change in the world. These are not cosmetic, post facto constructions, but represent a belief structure about China’s inexorable rise through this machinery of history. That’s part of his driving mechanism as well.
Thirdly, he’s a pragmatic strategic leader who understands: my God, we’ve got Iran happening at the moment. What the hell am I going to do about it? Do I help the United States? Do I not? They created this problem at their own hands. What happens if I seek to intervene? Is it better that I don’t?
He’s a very pragmatic political leader as well. When I look at his posture and that of the system over which he presides — as Graham said, he’s the chairman of everything — he is an amalgam of these traditions, including the realism of the moment.
In terms of classical realism, for students of international relations theory, let me tell you: the Chinese invented realism before we’d even thought about it in the West. Look at Han Feizi, Li Si, the entire Chinese canon of the Seven Military Classics, Sunzi’s The Art of War. China’s realism has been around for at least two and a half thousand years. That animates China’s intellectual posture, and therefore Xi Jinping’s, as well.
When I say it’s not monochrome, it draws from these traditions. The reason I wrote the book is that the element least emphasised in the recent literature on China was the ideological Marxist-Leninist view. But it’s part of an amalgam.
Final audience questions
GR: We’re getting close to the witching hour. We’ll take four short questions, and Kevin can answer them together.
Audience question on Tibet: I’m Tenzin from Tibet. We’ve just had another major earthquake in Tibet. How do you see Tibet as an Achilles’ heel for China in the broader US–China strategic rivalry? How can we bring Tibet and human rights back to the forefront of US–China relations rather than allowing them to be overshadowed by economic and security interests?
Audience question on language: How has studying Mandarin meaningfully progressed or changed the way you understand China or Xi’s politics? What gets lost in translation when American or Australian leaders engage with China purely through English translation?
Audience question on Europe: You said China was building a technology stack. Businesses in the US and Europe aren’t on an even playing field, given China’s supportive ecosystem and policy environment. If you were advising Europe, which is considering the Industrial Accelerator Act, do you think it’s a good idea? What should the European response be?
Audience question on China’s neighbours: It seems some neighbours could have had better relations with China, but China has pushed them into US arms: Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea and others. Why doesn’t China maximise its neighbourly relations?
China’s relationships with its neighbours
KR: We’ve got the doozies coming last. Let me be diplomatic and non-diplomatic in trying to answer them. I’ll do them in reverse.
China’s neighbourhood policy — its neighbouring relations strategy, or 周边国家关系 — is a core element of Chinese foreign policy strategy. About every half-decade to a decade, the Chinese system convenes a specific central party conference on the state of its relationships with its neighbours. These are fascinating documents to read, primarily because they’re never released, so we don’t know what’s in them. We have People’s Daily summaries.
The Chinese have sought to become the indispensable economic partner of their neighbours, with a subliminal expectation that those neighbours will therefore be respectful of China’s fundamental political and foreign policy interests. That is the sometimes less-than-opaquely stated subtext of China’s general neighbourhood policy.
In classical international relations theory, when states sense the rise of a major power, they have two options: they either balance or they bandwagon. They balance against the rising power, in this case China, or they bandwagon with it because they think there’s no alternative.
You see those dynamics at play with China’s neighbours. Russia has bandwagoned. Other countries have adopted different postures, including Japan and the Republic of Korea.
For Southeast Asia in particular, and to some extent Northeast Asia and Central Asia, there is also a long residual historical memory of China’s tributary state system, through the Ming and Qing: 500 years of an expectation that China would trade with its neighbours so long as they did not misbehave, and then your head would be delivered on a platter to the emperor. There’s a fair bit of established foreign policy history around this.
It’s an amalgam of the above. But the principal driver at present, as in imperial times, is the opportunity to enjoy the riches and largesse of the Chinese market, with a certain political and foreign policy conditionality attached.
Europe’s industrial response
KR: On the technology stack, Europe and the Accelerator Act: the structural point I made before is that the sheer size and momentum of the Chinese techno-industrial strategy is now washing so broadly across the European economy that a reaction is inevitable.
German manufacturing losing 12,000 jobs a month, Volkswagen with a plan to sack 100,000 employees, and a genuine question about the future of German auto writ large — but beyond auto, other sectors as well — are generating these reactions.
What are the two courses of response? China could voluntarily agree not to do it. You see the slightest indication of that in its recent agreement to quotas on the export of hybrid cars to Europe. But frankly, against the central drivers of what is occurring, that just won’t wash.
On the content of the European Accelerator Act, I regard that as a natural and normal action to protect that which you have.
Where do we get to in the end? China’s strategy is that if it can hold on and continue to prevail, ultimately its price structures will prevail, and what some would argue are its subsidised export prices.
Europeans will look at that and say, “But will there be any European manufacturing left? Does that matter?” The Europeans would say, “Yes, it does matter, not just because of employment, but because when we require certain essential manufactures in the future, do we remain ultimately hostage to one single supplier in the world?”
I think it’s an inevitable structural response to what the critics of China’s techno-industrial strategy would describe as its unbalanced and therefore unsustainable economic model.
Understanding China from the inside out
KR: On language: if any of you are considering futures in foreign policy or strategic policy, the essential discipline is simply this: to understand otherness. That’s easy to say, but by God, it’s hard to do.
At the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, we have one discipline: everyone has to be a linguist.
Secondly, we understand China from the inside out, not the outside in. We look at the Chinese internal literature which, despite its opacity, does describe an internal debate about which direction China is going in and why.
Thirdly, we reflect on what the rest of the world, for example the Europeans, could and should perhaps do in response. Language is a tool to reinforce the discipline of understanding otherness.
There’s a great hazard we’ve all got, called the English language. The Brits invented it. It was a minor language over there. If you read Chaucerian English, how could that ever become a global language? It’s incomprehensible.
But it did because we had this thing called the British Empire. They colonised this country, which then became the largest country in the world, and they learned English — well, sort of. As a result, English has become the dominant global language.
There’s a real hazard in this: it carries a whole bunch of inherent cultural assumptions which do not provide an adequate and respectful understanding of the otherness of the world.
In this age, when the countries and economies of the Asia-Pacific, on any piece of economic mathematics, will dominate the global economy by the second half of this century, it becomes axiomatic to understand from the inside out.
It doesn’t need to be Chinese necessarily, but it would certainly need to include the principal languages of the region in one form or another.
Tibet and religious autonomy
KR: Saving the doozy until last: Tibet, which of course is not a sensitive subject. Looking to all my Chinese friends here, looking at me with great pain and anxiety, and looking at my Tibetan friend with equal pain and anxiety, can I say the following?
The history has been complex, tortuous and difficult.
Secondly, I’ve met the Dalai Lama on many occasions in the past, often to the complete chagrin of my Chinese friends. As prime minister of Australia or as leader of the opposition in Australia, that’s what I did.
Thirdly, this will come to a new crisis point when the Dalai Lama dies. He’s already 90. What happens with the reincarnation at that point?
China has indicated that the reincarnation will occur within China. The Dalai Lama has said it will occur outside China, presumably in Dharamsala, where the Indian government currently hosts the Tibetan spiritual leadership in exile.
I would hope that, on this question of religious dignity and autonomy, we can find a way through for the future, given the depth of Buddhist sentiment which still exists across the entire Tibetan culture and civilisation, and in a manner which doesn’t erupt in violence.
I don’t know where the landing point is. But there must be a way through on this one.
Thanks, Graham.
GR: Thank you. What a fantastic opportunity to have our colleague back. We’re hoping that in one of the next chapters of his life it’ll be full-time here, but not quite yet.
KR: Thanks, folks. Appreciate it.